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Abstract
Altruism or ‘regard for others’ can encourage self-restraint among gen-
erators of negative externalities, thereby mitigating the externality problem.
We explore how introducing impure altruism into standard regulatory set-
tings alters regulatory prescriptions. We show that the optimal calibration
of both quantitative controls and externality taxes are affected. It also leads
to surprising results on the comparative performance of instruments. Under
quantity-based regulation welfare is increasing in the propensity for altru-
ism in the population; under price-based regulation the relationship is non-
monotonic. Price-based regulation is preferred when the population is either
predominantly altruistic or predominantly selfish, quantity-based regulation
for cases in between.
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1 Introduction
People often face situations in which their private activities – such as driving the
family car or generating household waste – impose negative externalities. In many
cases those activities are subject to regulatory control or influence, in the form of
quantitative limits or taxation. But even in the absence of regulation, it is plausi-
ble that ‘regard for others’ or the desire to ‘do the right thing’ – the two will be
analytically equivalent in the framework that we develop – might induce people to
moderate, to varying extents, their behavior voluntarily.
Many British motorists report moderating their driving habits in order to reduce
their impact on others (see, for example, Daily Telegraph (2007)). The desire for
moderation is present despite there being a corrective tax levied on petrol in the
United Kingdom that is – according to estimates by Parry and Small (2005) – about
twice the level needed to internalize the air quality and accident risk externalities
associated with motoring.
Production of domestic waste is another area where surveys suggest that house-
holders are sensitive to the external impact of their actions. According to Berglund
(2006), 73% of people report that part of the motive for their recycling of waste
is that they “want to contribute to a better local environment”. Waste reduction
provides an example where there are alternative regulatory approaches in use. In
the English county of Surrey household waste is subject to ‘quantity caps’: the lo-
cal council issues a ‘wheelie bin’ of particular dimension to each address and will
only collect rubbish up to that volume – requiring that the lid be closed to avoid
ambiguity about the allowance. In neighboring Buckinghamshire a price instrument
is used – households can put out as much waste as they wish but it has to be in
designated refuse sacks, which can be bought from the council.
In this paper we introduce altruistic or other-regarding tendencies into a regu-
lated population. In particular we contemplate impure altruism, and the associated
notions of ‘warm glow’ and ‘cold prickle’ introduced by Andreoni (1991). The sug-
gestion here is that agents derive a warm glow benefit from contributing to a clean
environment or, conversely, a cold prickle disbenefit from damaging it. In our model
the behavior of agents is moderated, to varying degrees, by the ‘guilt’ or otherwise
negative feeling that they derive from imposing unpleasantness on others in their
1
community.1 We explore how such other-regarding tendencies impact policy pre-
scription: specifically, (a) the way in which any particular regulatory instrument is
calibrated, and, (b) the comparative merits of alternative instruments. We develop
a model in the context of a depletable or local externality, but the model could
readily be extended to the case of a public bad.
There is a long tradition of instrument comparison in environmental economics.
Baumol and Oates (1971) made an early case for the use of taxation in the control of
externalities, while Weitzman (1974) pointed out that, when benefits and abatement
costs are uncertain, the choice between price and quantity instruments depends
upon the comparative slopes of the marginal benefit and marginal cost curves. In
other well-known early contributions the comparative merits of price versus quantity
instruments were explored in different frameworks in Adar and Griffin (1976) and
Roberts and Spence (1976).2 Economists usually express a preference for price-
based instruments over quantitative restrictions. This is largely because tax-based
restrictions are able to deliver efficiency in contexts where different regulated parties
face different costs of compliance – they provide for enough flexibility that an agent
with very high compliance costs can emit more than his counterpart with lower ones.
We present a model in which individuals’ choices impose external costs. The
model is populated by agents exhibiting different degrees of impure altruism – that
is, individuals suffer different degrees of the ‘cold prickle’ sensation from imposing
externalities on others. We introduce, in other words, motivational heterogeneity.
The model has otherwise standard features, including heterogeneity in compliance
costs. We investigate how introducing altruism leads us to update our views regard-
ing optimal specification of a particular instrument and optimal instrument choice.
The scenario absent altruism (the conventional textbook case) remains nested here
as a special case, and the benchmark against which our results are compared.
We find that the choice between regulatory instruments depends on the nature of
1Alternatively, we could interpret the altruism parameter that we introduce in our model as
capturing ‘principles’ or morals. These may derive from religious conviction, from cultural norms
reinforced by education, etc. Christians are told to “Do unto others as you would have them do
to you” (Luke ch. 6, v. 31). Taoists are taught to “Regard you neighbour’s gain as your gain, and
your neighbour’s loss as your loss” (teachings of Tai Shang Kan Yin P’ien).
2More recently the basic model has been extended in various directions. Williams (2002) dif-
ferentiates between tradable and non-tradable quantity instruments; Kaplow and Shavell (2002)
allow for non-linear taxes; Stavins (1996) considers the effect of correlation between cost and benefit
uncertainties; Montero (2002) allows for less-than-full compliance.
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the heterogeneity in the regulated population. Price-based instruments are good at
handling heterogeneity in compliance costs (the only sort of variation that features
in many existing models) but less-suited to handling motivational heterogeneity.
When there is no motivational heterogeneity the price instrument is unambiguously
superior in our model. Once motivational heterogeneity is introduced the ranking of
instruments becomes more complex, and quantity-based instruments may dominate.
While we develop our results in a relatively general setting, the complexity is
best illustrated through a simple example. Imagine that there are just two types
of individuals: some who are entirely selfish and others who are altruistic to the
same extent. Our example compares the performance of price- and quantity-based
instruments across populations that differ only in the proportions of these two types.
We find that under optimal quantity-based regulation welfare is increasing in the
proportion of the population that is altruistic. Under optimal price-based regulation
the relationship turns out to be non-monotonic. In particular, price-based regula-
tion is superior when the regulated population is either predominantly altruistic or
predominantly selfish, and quantity-based regulation may dominate for intermediate
cases.
2 The Model
An agent chooses a level x ∈ <+ of some anti-social activity that imposes external
costs cx on some other individual. For concreteness we regard x as ‘emissions’ but we
encourage the reader to think of x as the level of any externality-generating behavior,
rather than merely the headline categories of pollution. For modeling purposes we
assume that this negative externality is depletable – the experience of the externality
by one agent reduces the amount felt by others. This is natural in settings where
the externality has a neighborhood dimension, for example, or in contexts in which
agents are imposing externalities by their exploitation of a common pool resource
or commons.3 For simplicity we assume that the external cost is linear in x, with
constant marginal cost c > 0.
3Alternatively, we could have assumed that the externality is non-depletable, that is, in the
nature of a ‘public bad’. See Mas-Colell et al. (1995: 364) for an elaboration of the difference
in two approaches. The qualitative results of our model would be preserved in that alternative
setting: our arguments require only that we have a private actor who benefits from the activity
and imposes an external cost on others.
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Agents differ in two important ways. One, they differ in the benefit they derive
from the activity. Two, they differ in the extent to which they are sensitive to the
impacts of their activity upon others. It is the latter variation that is the novelty in
our framework. To capture these effects, we endow our agents with utility functions
of the form
θib(xi)− αicxi. (1)
Agent i derives private benefit θib(xi) from the activity level xi, where θi > 0 captures
the heterogeneity in the benefit that different agents derive from the activity. We
assume that private benefit increases concavely in x – that is, b′(x) ≥ 0 and b′′(x) < 0
– which corresponds to diminishing marginal utility to engagement in the activity.
The second term captures the ‘cold prickle’ that the agent suffers on imposing
the externality on some neighbor. The term αi ∈ [0, 1] measures the intensity of the
cold prickle and can be viewed as the degree of altruism. It captures the extent to
which altruism induces behavior as if the externality were internalized.4 We do not
assume that all agents are altruistic to the same degree, though the model allows
for that possibility. The standard ‘textbook’ case with selfish agents is nested here
as the special case in which αi = 0 for all i.
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An agent, then, is characterized by the pair (θ, α): we drop subscripts where it
causes no ambiguity. These characteristics are assumed to be private information
though their distribution in the population is known, and given by distribution
functions F (θ) and G(α). We assume that the two distributions are independent
and, importantly, we leave the form of G entirely general.6
In the absence of regulation an agent chooses x to maximize (1). Under the usual
4As noted above, α could also capture ‘principles’ – views about the ‘right way to behave’ –
rather than altruism. For instance, perfect conformance with Taoist principles would imply acting
as if α = 1, although we could expect adherents to vary in the extent of their resolution (that
is, act in a way consistent with α less than 1). The case with α = 1, if universalized, maximizes
social welfare and corresponds to the Kantian ideal. Bilodeau and Gravel (2004) examine the
implications of agents exhibiting a Kantian ethic in a game of voluntary public good contributions.
5For simplicity we have assumed that, apart from cold prickle, there are no other direct costs
of the activity for the agent. If such costs exist, these can incorporated in θib(xi) – then to be
regarded as private benefit net of private costs – with only minor modifications to the arguments
that follow.
6We also assume that G(α) is exogenously fixed. Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) and Gneezy
and Rustichini (2000b) provide evidence that a policy instrument in use can itself change attitudes
towards misbehavior. We later discuss the implications of those findings.
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conditions the solution is interior and implicitly defined by the first-order condition
θb′(x)− αc = 0. (2)
We denote this choice as x∅(θ, α). The subscript ∅ will be used to refer to the
unregulated setting, to distinguish it from choices and outcomes under quantity-
based and price-based regulation.
2.1 Altruism and welfare
There has been some debate in the literature as to how to treat warm-glow benefits/cold-
prickle costs in the evaluation of social welfare. We follow Diamond and Hausman
(1994), Andreoni (2004), and Diamond (2006) in assuming that warm glow bene-
fits should be ignored in the welfare evaluation. Bernheim and Rangel (2005: 59)
offer the following summary and assessment: “Diamond (2006) argues that mea-
sures of social welfare should exclude the apparent benefits from the warm glow.
He advocates using the warm glow model for positive purposes (that is, to describe
behavior), but favors the standard model for evaluating welfare. Andreoni (2004)
expresses a similar view.”
If so, the evaluation of the welfare associated with an agent’s chosen activity
level includes only the benefits that he derives from the activity and the negative
externality that he imposes on others. Formally, the ‘welfare contribution’ of the
i-th agent’s choice is
w(θi, xi) = θib(xi)− cxi. (3)
The level of activity that maximizes an agent’s welfare contribution – call this
socially-optimal level of activity xˆ – then satisfies
θib
′(xˆ)− c = 0.
Given that b(x) is concave, the socially-optimal level xˆ(θi) is increasing in θi. Given
that we ignore warm-glow benefits in the evaluation of welfare, the socially-optimal
choice is independent of αi.
Of course the actual choice of unregulated agents does vary with α. Agents with
α < 1 choose activity levels that exceed the first-best level: x∅(θ, α) ≥ xˆ(θ). The
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chosen level is decreasing in α, and a perfectly altruistic agent’s choice coincides
with the socially-optimal level: x∅(θ, 1) = xˆ(θ).
An unregulated agent’s choice has associated welfare contribution
w∅(θ, α) = θb(x∅(θ, α))− cx∅(θ, α). (4)
It is straightforward to establish that w∅(θ, α) is increasing in α, with α = 1 achieving
the first-best.
Aggregate welfare depends on the distribution of θ and α in the population.
Given distribution functions F (θ) and G(α), aggregate welfare in the absence of
regulation is
W∅ =
∫
θ
∫
α
w∅(θ, α)dG(α)dF (θ).
3 Quantity Regulation
Quantity regulation entails the regulator imposing upon each agent a maximum
admissible level of the activity. If, for example, the externality follows from the
over-production of household waste the local government could set a cap on the
volume of waste it is willing to collect from any given address. The cap is fully and
costlessly enforced.
Recall that the welfare-optimizing level of activity xˆ(θi) varies with θi. If the
regulator were able to observe agent-specific characteristics then he could implement
the first-best outcome by imposing agent-specific regulatory caps equal to xˆ(θi).
Given that θi is private information, though, the regulator can do no better than
set a uniform regulatory cap, call it x.
The existence of altruistic agents – those with strictly positive α’s – creates the
possibility that a uniform cap may not bind on all agents. Not everyone lives ‘at the
limits of the law’. Some, guided to restraint by their altruistic concern for damage
imposed upon others, will choose a level of activity strictly less than the cap.7 More
7We are familiar with two other papers in which (for quite different reasons) caps may not bind
on all regulated parties. Brozovic, Sunding and Zilberman (2004) assume an interior solution to
the firms unregulated pollution problem. This contrasts with the (more conventional) assumption
that costs are everywhere decreasing in emissions, such that all firms produce at a point where
any quantitative emissions cap is binding. Bandyopadhyay and Horowitz (2006) point to a ‘safety
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concretely, the cap is binding on agents for whom x∅(θ, α) ≥ x, which includes those
who derive high benefit from the activity (large θ) or those who not very altruistic
(small α). Thus, under a regime of quantity caps the agent’s choice is
xQ(θ, α, x) = min[x∅(θ, α), x].
With quantity capped at x an agent’s welfare contribution is
wQ(θ, α, x) = θb(xQ(θ, α, x))− cxQ(θ, α, x),
and aggregate welfare, as function of the chosen quantity cap, is
WQ(x) =
∫
θ
∫
α
wQ(θ, α, x)dG(α)dF (θ).
For particular values of θ and x, define the critical value α(θ, x) ∈ [0, 1] such that
the given regulatory cap binds for agents with lower α. Then
WQ(x) =
∫
θ
[∫ α(θ,x)
0
w(θ, x)dG(α) +
∫ 1
α(θ,x)
w∅(θ, α)dG(α)
]
dF (θ).
The first integral captures the welfare contribution of agents for whom the regula-
tory cap binds, the second of those whose behavior is restrained by altruism. The
regulator chooses x to maximize aggregate welfare. Assuming differentiability, and
using the fact that w∅(θ, α(θ, x)) = w(θ, x), we have
W ′Q(x) =
∫
θ
[∫ α(θ,x)
0
w′(θ, x)dG(α)
]
dF (θ),
where w′(θ, x) = θb′(x) − c. Assuming an interior solution, the optimal regulatory
cap x∗ is given by the first-order condition W ′Q(x
∗) = 0.8
How does the presence of altruistic agents affect the optimal regulatory cap? We
compare the general case analyzed here with the ‘traditional’ economic analysis that
margin’ effect whereby a firm would stay inside a quantitative limit if its realized pollution discharge
had a stochastic element (it could only control its pollution level noisily) and penalties for violation
were sufficiently large. They use this as an alternative to the altruistic ‘explanation’ for why firms
appear to overcomply.
8The second-order condition is satisfied as W (x) is concave in x. To see why, note that
wQ(θ, α, x) is weakly concave in x. Integration preserves concavity in x.
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ignores any self-restraint due to altruism – the special case in which αi = 0 for all i
– and find that the presence of altruistic agents allows for less stringent regulation.
Proposition 1 The presence of altruistic agents raises the optimal regulatory cap.
Proof: Let x∗(G) be the optimal regulatory cap for any non-generate distribution
G(α). The first-order condition for optimality requires∫
θ
∫ α(θ,x∗(G))
0
w′(θ, x∗(G))dG(α)dF (θ) = 0. (5)
The traditional case, with selfish agents, amounts to one in which G(α) is degenerate
at α = 0, or that G(0) = 1. For this case any regulatory cap binds on all agents,
and the optimal cap – call it x˜ – must be such that
W ′(x˜) =
∫
θ
w′(θ, x˜)dF (θ) = 0. (6)
As w′(θ, x˜) does not vary with α, we can rewrite the above as∫
θ
∫ α(θ,x∗(G))
0
w′(θ, x˜)dG(α)dF (θ) +
∫
θ
∫ 1
α(θ,x∗(G))
w′(θ, x˜)dG(α)dF (θ) = 0. (7)
To demonstrate that x∗(G) ≥ x˜, assume, to the contrary, that x˜ > x∗(G). Noting
that w′(θ, x) = θb′(x) − c, due to the concavity of b(x) we must have w′(θ, x˜) <
w′(θ, x∗(G)). Then, comparing (5) and (7), it follows that the first term in (7) must
be negative; if so the second term in (7) must necessarily be positive. Thus our
assumption requires ∫
θ
∫ 1
α(x∗(G),θ)
w′(θ, x˜)dG(α)dF (θ) > 0. (8)
Note that the marginal welfare contribution is negative for α > α(x˜, θ),
w′(x˜, θ) = θb′(x˜)− c < θb′(x˜)− αc < 0, (9)
and so also for α > α(x∗(G), θ) > α(x˜, θ). If so, (8) cannot hold. We have a
contradiction. 
So in this setting altruistic tendencies can be regarded as a substitute for regula-
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tion – more of the former implies there should be less of the latter. In the absence
of altruism, the optimal quota trades off allowing some agents (those with low θ) to
do an inefficiently high level of the activity with constraining others (with high θ)
to do too little. The introduction of altruism means that the costs associated with
allowing low benefit agents to do too much are now decreased, because some agents
will exercise voluntary self-restraint. This leads to an increase in the optimal quota.
4 Price Regulation
An alternative to setting quantitative limits on the activity is to impose a tax or
charge on it. If the externality derives from the over-production of household waste
then the local government could charge by volume or weight for collection. We
assume throughout that the tax is fully and costlessly collected. If the activity is
taxed at rate t, the agent characterized by (θ, α) will choose x to maximize
θb(x)− tx− αcx.
The first-order condition associated with an interior maximum is
θb′(x)− t− αc = 0.
From the concavity of b(x), we know that an agent’s optimal choice, xP (θ, α, t), is
increasing in θ and decreasing in t or α: other things equal, agents will do more of
the activity if they find cutting back expensive, and will do less if they are more
altruistic or if the tax rate is high.
In this regime, the agent’s welfare contribution is
wP (θ, α, t) = θb(xP (θ, α, t))− cxP (θ, α, t),
so that aggregate welfare
WP (t) =
∫
θ
∫
α
wP (θ, α, t)dG(α)dF (θ) (10)
varies with chosen tax rate t. The first-order condition9 for the optimal tax rate t∗ is
9To see that the second-order condition holds note that wP (θ, α, t) is concave in t as the deriva-
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W ′P (t
∗) = 0, where
W ′P (t) =
∫
θ
∫
α
∂
∂t
[wP (θ, α, t)]dG(α)dF (θ). (11)
We have
∂
∂t
[wP (θ, α, t)] = [θb
′(xP )− c]dxP
dt
= [t− (1− α)c] 1
θb′′(xP )
.
The last equality obtains from manipulation of the first-order condition for the
agent’s maximum, and makes transparent the role of taxation. The tax can be
thought of as correcting the insufficiency of altruism in restraining the anti-social
activity. Given heterogeneity in altruistic concerns, the ideal corrective tax rate
must vary too: the optimal tax to face agent i would be ti = (1 − αi )c. If αi = 1,
no taxation is necessary – in making decisions the agent is already acting as if the
externality were incident upon himself. If αi = 0, the optimal tax rate is c, the
standard Pigovian prescription. In general, for α’s that are positive but less than 1,
the optimal tax rate is positive but less than c.
We note that if αi = k for all i – then the regulator could implement the first
best by setting a tax equal to (1− k)c. By appropriate manipulation of the tax rate
the same first best level of welfare could be achieved regardless of the value of k.
With unobservable heterogeneity in α, however, optimal tax policy must pick a
uniform tax rate that minimizes the welfare impact of distortions across agents. At
the optimum an interval of the most altruistic agents in the population will face a
tax that is ‘too high’, an interval of the least so face a tax that is too low. It is clear
that at the optimum, the tax rate will not exceed c, which leads us to:
Proposition 2 The presence of altruistic agents lowers the optimal tax rate.
Proof. For the traditional textbook case without altruism, αi = 0 for all agents, so
the optimal tax rate is simply c. We show that for the general case with altruism,
tive
∂wP
∂t
= [θb′(xP )− c] ∂xP
∂t
= [t− c(1− α)] ∂xP
∂t
is positive for small t (i.e., t − c(1 − α) < 0) and negative for large t. The integral, a convex
combination of these concave functions, inherits the concavity.
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the optimal tax rate t∗ < c. The optimal tax rate satisfies
W ′P (t
∗) =
∫
θ
∫
α
[t∗ − (1− α)c]
θb′′(xP (θ, α, t∗))
dG(α)dF (θ) = 0.
For this to hold for a non-degenerate distribution G(α), we must have [t∗−(1−αi)c]
strictly positive for some αi and negative for other αi in the support of distributionG.
[Recall that b′′ < 0 due to the concavity of b.] Let the support of αi be [αmin, αmax].
If t∗ − c+ αminc < 0, we must have t∗ − c < 0 as long as αmin ≥ 0 (which is true by
assumption). 
5 Instrument Choice
How do the two forms of regulation compare in terms of welfare outcomes? How
does the insertion of altruism into a model of externality with otherwise standard
features lead us to reconsider the comparative merits of quantity- versus price-based
policy?
We compare optimally-calibrated quantity- and price-based regulation in the
presence of altruism. Let W ∗Q denote aggregate welfare under quantity regulation
when the regulatory cap is chosen optimally. That is, W ∗Q = WQ(x
∗). Similarly, let
W ∗P = WP (t
∗) denote the optimized value of welfare under price regulation when
tax rate is chosen optimally. It is clear from the analysis of previous section that
these optimized values vary with the distributions G(α) and F (θ). Our focus in this
paper is on how G(α), the distribution of altruism in the population, affects the
relative performance of price and quantity regulation.
To compare price and quantity regulation, we begin by examining how welfare
under these regimes varies with an increase in the degree of altruism in the popula-
tion (in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance10, in effect, more mass on higher
values of α) and by an increase in the heterogeneity of the altruism parameter (in
the sense of mean-preserving spreads, or more mass on the tails of the distribution).
We have the following propositions.
10For any two distributions G1(α) and G2(α), we say that G1(α) first-order stochastically dom-
inates G2(α) if G1(α) ≤ G2(α) for all α.
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Proposition 3 Given distribution G(α), let W ∗Q(G) be the optimized level of welfare
under quantity regulation. An increase in the degree of altruism in the sense of first-
order stochastic dominance increases W ∗Q(G). In contrast, a mean-preserving spread
of G(α) may increase or decrease the value of W ∗Q(G).
Proof. To show that welfare under quantity regulation is increasing in altruism, we
begin by considering a fixed regulatory cap. Given x, there exists α(θ, x) such that
the cap binds for α < α(θ, x). Aggregate welfare is
WQ(x;G) =
∫
θ
[∫ α(θ,x)
0
w(θ, x)dG(α) +
∫ 1
α(θ,x)
w∅(θ, α)dG(α)
]
dF (θ).
We claim that w∅(θ, α) > w(θ, x) for α > α(θ, x). To see why, note that from
the optimality of x∅, we have θb′(x∅) − αc = 0. If so, θb′(x∅) − c < 0 for α < 1,
or that w(θ, x) = θb(x) − cx is decreasing in the neighborhood of x∅. Given that
x∅(θ, α) < x for α > α(θ, x), the claim follows. If G1(α) first-order stochastically
dominates G2(α), it attaches more weight to relatively high values of α. Given that
w∅(θ, α) ≥ w(θ, x), we have WQ(x;G1) ≥ WQ(x;G2). Given this inequality holds
for arbitrary x, the optima can be ranked: W ∗Q(G1) ≥ W ∗Q(G2).
The ambiguity of mean-preserving spreads on W ∗Q follows from the fact that, as
a function of α, individual welfare contribution wQ(θ, α, x) has both convex and
concave intervals. If so, the impact of a mean-preserving spread on aggregate welfare
W ∗Q is sensitive to the choice of distribution G(α).
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Proposition 4 Given distribution G(α), let W ∗P (G) be the optimized level of welfare
under price regulation. An increase in the degree of altruism in the sense of first-
order stochastic dominance may increase or decrease W ∗P (G). A mean preserving
spread of G(α) decreases the value W ∗P (G).
Proof. To show that welfare under price regulation could fall or rise as the popu-
lation becomes more altruistic, compare welfare under three distributions. Let the
first be one in which all agents are selfish (αi = 0 for all i); in the second half the
population is selfish and half is perfectly altruistic (α = 1); in the third all agents are
perfectly altruistic. By construction, these capture increasing altruism in the sense
11This ambiguity is easily established by numerical example, available from the authors.
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of first-order stochastic dominance. Note that optimal price regulation achieves the
first-best outcome in the first case (by setting tax equal to marginal external damage
c) and in the third case (setting tax equal to zero), while no uniform rate of tax can
achieve that in the second population.
The second part follows from the fact that wP (θ, α, t) is concave in α. To see why,
note that the derivative
∂wP
∂α
= [θb′(xP )− c] ∂xP
∂α
= [t− c(1− α)] ∂xP
∂α
is positive for small α (i.e., t − c(1 − α) < 0) and negative for large α. A mean
preserving spread of the distribution G(α) lowers WP (t) for any fixed tax rate t. As
a mean preserving spread of G(α) causes the entire function WP (t) to move down,
the maximized value of this function – that is, W ∗P – must necessarily fall. 
To sum up, an increase in altruistic tendency weakly increases W ∗Q but has
an ambiguous effect on W ∗P . On the other hand, greater dispersion in the degree
of altruism lowers W ∗P but has an ambiguous impact on W
∗
Q. These properties
are useful in comparing the relative merits of the two regulatory instrument under
alternative distributions of altruism.
Before comparing policies in the presence of altruistic agents, we note the bench-
mark result that obtains in our model in the absence of altruism. If αi = 0 for all i,
price-regulation achieves the first-best outcome in our setting. Given our assump-
tion that the cost of the externality is linear, the marginal cost of the externality
is invariant to choices, and the externality can entirely be corrected by setting the
tax at the Pigovian level. Any heterogeneity in compliance costs θi ensures that no
quantity cap can match that, and must deliver a strictly inferior outcome. Thus, in
our setting price-based regulation (weakly) dominates quantity-based regulation in
the absence of altruism. In so biasing policy preference in favor of price instruments,
we can highlight how the introduction of altruism qualifies that preference.
Proposition 5 In the presence of altruism, quantity-based regulation dominates
price-based regulation when there is no or little heterogeneity in θ, while price-based
regulation dominates when there is no or little heterogeneity in α.
Proof. To establish the first part, let the distribution F (θ) collapse around its
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mean θ (that is, let θi = θ for all i). Then the optimal cap, implicitly defined by
θb′(x∗) − c = 0, achieves the first-best outcome, while a tax regime does not as
long as there is some heterogeneity in α. Next, consider perturbations of F (θ) that
allow some heterogeneity around θ. Given the strict ranking above, by continuity
the outcome under quantity regulation dominates as long as heterogeneity in θ is
sufficiently small relative to heterogeneity in α.
To establish the second part, let the distribution G(α) collapse around some
value α (that is, let αi = α for all i). Then the optimal tax, defined by t
∗ = (1−α)c,
achieves the first-best outcome, while the quantity-based regime does not as long as
there is some heterogeneity in θ. As in the previous case, by continuity the outcome
under price regulation dominates the outcome under quantity regulation as long as
heterogeneity in α is sufficiently small. 
The proof highlights the comparative efficiency of the two regulatory instruments
by focusing on extreme cases. Removing variability in compliance costs but leaving
some variability in altruism implies that quantity regulation can implement the first
best, while price regulation cannot. Conversely removing variability in altruism but
leaving some variability in compliance costs implies that price regulation can imple-
ment the first best, while quantity regulation cannot. In fact the implicit preference
for price-based regulation in our benchmark with purely selfish agents follows not
from the absence of altruistic tendencies but rather from their homogeneity: that
all the αi were of common value, rather than the fact that the common value was
zero.
In sum, other things equal, price regulation is better at handling technological
heterogeneity (variation in θ) whilst quantity-based regulation is better at handling
‘motivational’ heterogeneity (variation in α).
5.1 An Example
More generally, once we allow for significant heterogeneity in both α and θ, there is
no natural ordering of one type of instrument over the other. Welfare under quantity
regulation may be higher or lower than that under price regulation for arbitrary
distributions F (θ) and G(α). In settings that display both forms of heterogeneity,
the relative performance of the two regimes is sensitive to the specifics of underlying
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distributions.
However some qualitative conclusions emerge in simple settings. Assume that
the distribution F (θ) is non-degenerate and invariant in the analysis that follows.
Consider a population with a two-point distribution for the altruism parameter, with
a fraction pi of the population being highly altruistic, with α = αH > 0, and the rest
being selfish, with α = 0. Our aim is to compare the relative performance of the two
regulatory instruments as pi, the proportion of altruistic agents in the population,
varies over the interval [0, 1]. With slight abuse of notation we now write W ∗Q and
W ∗P as functions of pi, namely W
∗
Q(pi) and W
∗
P (pi).
The general propositions above shed light on the behavior of these functions.
One, it follows from Proposition 4 that price-based regulation achieves the first-best
outcome when pi = 0 (by setting the tax optimally at c) or when pi = 1 (by setting
the tax optimally at (1− αH)c). The level of welfare delivered is the same in either
case cases, or W ∗P (0) = W
∗
P (1) = W
FB (where the superscript ‘FB’ denotes the
‘first-best’). Two, values of pi strictly within the unit interval imply dispersion in
the altruism parameter, and must deliver strictly lower welfare: W ∗P (pi) < W
FB
for 0 < pi < 1. So the graph of optimized welfare delivered by the tax regime is
non-monotonic, in fact U -shaped, in pi.
What of W ∗Q? Given the assumed heterogeneity in θ, we have W
∗
Q(0) < W
∗
P (0)
and W ∗Q(1) < W
∗
P (1): at each extreme quantity-based regulation cannot quite match
price-based regulation, which delivers the first-best outcome. Further, an increase in
pi amounts to an increase in altruism in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance,
so by Proposition 3, W ∗Q(pi) is weakly increasing in pi.
Figure 1 plots W ∗Q(pi) and W
∗
P (pi) as pi varies in the unit interval. It is plotted
for the most interesting case, namely that in which W ∗Q and W
∗
P cross. We cannot
rule out, but ignore here, the possibility that for some distributions F (θ) and G(α),
W ∗Q may lie everywhere below W
∗
P .
In terms of Figure 1 we note that there are intervals of pi close to zero and close to
one where W ∗P > W
∗
Q. The tax instrument performs best when altruistic tendencies
are relatively homogeneous in the population, which happens in the vicinity of pi = 0
and pi = 1. With unobservable heterogeneity in the α’s the regulator is obliged to
set a tax based on average responses – one that is too high than would ideally be
set for an altruistic agent and too low than would ideally be set for a selfish one.
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Figure 1: Welfare comparison
When there is greater dispersion in the level of altruism – values of pi close to the
middle of the unit interval amount to greater dispersion – the losses due to those
departures are their greatest.
More generally, what policy conclusions can we draw in such settings?
Remark 1 Price-based regulation is better than quantity-based regulation when the
proportion of altruistic agents in the population is either sufficiently high or suf-
ficiently low. Quantity-based regulation may be better for a range of intermediate
values.
We determined these intervals numerically for a calibrated example. We consid-
ered the case where b(x) is logarithmic, c = 1, and θ is distributed uniformly over the
interval [10, 30]. If αH = 0.75, we found that tax-based regulation is superior when
pi is below 0.31 or above 0.98, while quantity caps are superior in the intermediate
range.
5.2 Mixed instruments
Given that price and quantity regulation cope differently with the two categories
of heterogeneity, it seems plausible that a richer class of hybrid regulatory regimes
might do better. Consider a regulatory regime that combines price and quantity
regulation, say by allowing agents to carry out the activity to some specified level x
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at no cost, and charging a tax rate t for any excess over that. The regimes considered
above can be viewed as special cases within this class, with price regulation being
the special case where x = 0 (so that all positive levels of activity were taxed at
rate t) and quantity caps being the special case where the tax rate above x was
prohibitive (so that no agent would choose to exceed x).12
How does this richer regime affect choices made by altruistic agents? The agent’s
choice problem now is to choose x to maximize
θib(xi)− αicxi − tmax{x− x, 0}
For given (θ, x, t), we can now identify two critical values that partition the set
of agents according to their altruism: as before there exists α(θ, x) ∈ [0, 1] such
that individuals with higher α are restrained below x by their altruism and choose
x∅(θ, α). Further, there exists αc(θ, x, t) ≤ α(θ, x) such that individuals with α <
αc choose xP (θ, α, t) > x and pay tax accordingly. Individuals whose altruism
parameter lies within these two thresholds choose precisely x.
Aggregate welfare W (t, x), as a function of the policy parameters t and x, is∫
θ
[∫ αc
0
wP (θ, α, t)dG(α) +
∫ α
αc
w(θ, x)dG(α) +
∫ 1
α
w∅(θ, α)dG(α)
]
dF (θ).
Optimal calibration of policy instruments, t ≥ 0 and x ≥ 0 would satisfy the first-
order conditions
∂W
∂t
(x∗, t∗) =
∫
θ
[∫ αc
0
w′P (θ, α, t)dG(α)
]
dF (θ) = 0,
and
∂W
∂x
(x∗, t∗) =
∫
θ
[∫ α
αc
w′Q(θ, x)dG(α)
]
dF (θ) = 0,
for an interior solution, and with t∗ = 0 if ∂W
∂t
< 0, and x∗ = 0 if ∂W
∂x
< 0.
A regime that combines the use of price and quantity instruments can only im-
prove the outcome over regimes that restrict the value of any one of these instruments
12Of course, this two-step regulatory regime can be generalized even further, by considering
general non-linear tax schedules T (x) that specify the total tax to be paid for any given level of
activity x. We do not pursue this possibility here, and note that complex instruments are not often
observed in practice.
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– two instruments are, at least weakly, better than one.
While a general analysis of the effect of varying altruism is not straightforward,
but numerical analysis is feasible for particular examples. We considered the case
where b(x) is logarithmic and F (θ) and G(α) are uniform. In our numerical simula-
tions as the distribution of α became less dispersed, the optimal choice of tax-exempt
x∗ was found to fall (so that optimal policy in effect became ‘closer’ to price reg-
ulation). In contrast as the distribution of θ became less dispersed, the optimal
regime was found to involve higher level of taxation beyond x∗ (closer to quantity
regulation).
6 Thoughts on Two Issues
6.1 Tradability of the quantity instrument
Much of the ‘prices versus quantities’ literature has focused implicitly or explicitly
on major industrial pollutants, say, as sulphur dioxide or carbon emissions. In those
settings, the difficulties of choosing optimal quantitative restrictions for a heteroge-
nous population can be mitigated by allowing regulated firms to trade quantitative
caps. Not surprisingly, a lot of scholarly attention in recent years has focused on
the implications of tradable allocations.
Our decision to restrict our model to non-tradable quantity instruments can
be justified at three levels. Firstly, in many contexts, the relevant externality-
generating activity may not be amenable to trade. Our focus on altruism as a
restraining motivation points to individuals rather than firms as the unit of analysis.
In the motivating examples that we have provided it would be difficult – for a
variety of reasons ranging from practicality and relatively high transactions costs –
to contemplate tradable quantitative limits.
Secondly, we observe that policy generally involves legal standards or limits that
are not tradable. As Brozovic et al (2004: 1) note: “Our profession’s fondness for
the use of economic incentives notwithstanding, regulation via direct quantitative
control is commonplace in the real world. Diverse consumer and producer activ-
ities ... are controlled using maximum allowable limits.” Even in the context of
environmental regulation tradability remains the exception rather than the rule.
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Whilst there are important and high-profile exceptions in which quantitative limits
are allowed to be traded (sulphur emissions in the US, carbon emissions in the EU,
etc.) the great majority of quantity-based regulation do not incorporate tradability.
This is the case even with new regulations as followers of EU legislative output (for
example) will attest.13
Thirdly, where individual choices are conditioned by altruism, that altruism may
itself interfere with willingness to trade and likely market outcomes. Considering
limits rather than tradable permits meant that we were not obliged to address
the question of how an impurely altruistic agent would feel about selling his per-
mit, knowing that the buyer might herself use it as the basis for engaging in the
externality-generating activity. This sort of ‘complicity with’ anti-social behavior
would have required additional ad hoc modeling assumptions and would have served
to make predicting market outcomes and developing normative conclusions more dif-
ficult.14
6.2 How do these results articulate with Weitzman?
We did not aim to stick to the framework set out in Weitzman’s (1974) seminal paper
on comparing price- and quantity-regulation under uncertainty. The analysis here
can, however, be related to that paper and the associated literature that followed.
Our model departs from the standard Weitzman approach in two significant
ways. Firstly, in our model quantity regulation sets a quantitative upper bound
on activity levels but does not require, as in Weitzman’s model, that agents set
quantities exactly at the prescribed level. Indeed, an important and novel element
13A few randomly-selected recent examples of rule-making based on quantitative limits of these
sorts include: (a) The London Airports Noise Restrictions Notice (February 2007) placed an upper
bound on the noisiness of aircraft allowed to land at London’s Heathrow and Gatwick Airports; (b)
Authorizations to operate power stations in the UK are issued by the Environment Agency and set
limits on the amounts of a variety of air and water pollutants that the station can emit; (c) The
EC Waste Incineration Directive (2000/76/EC) limits emissions of heavy metals from incinerators;
(d) the 2001 EC Battery Directive (2001/338EC) limits the cadmium content of batteries; (e) In
2007 the European Commission proposed a move to mandatory standards for the fuel-efficiency
of new cars under which all cars sold in the EU must produce no more than 120 grams of carbon
dioxide per kilometer traveled.
14It could be speculated that introducing tradability into the current set-up would allow the
quantity instrument to achieve first best. However, this is not straightforward: without sufficient
restrictions trade could transfer the externality from relatively altruistic agents to those less so,
even when the former has a higher θ than the latter.
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of our model is that a cap will not necessarily bind on everyone – for instance, agents
with sufficiently high α’s will choose to stay strictly within it, and in setting optimal
regulatory standards we must recognize this possibility.
This modeling difference complicates comparison with Weitzman, and other
models in that tradition. Nonetheless, we could ask how welfare under quantity reg-
ulation of the conventional kind (that is, when regulation prescribed a level rather
than an upper bound) would compare with price regulation in our setting. Adapt-
ing the formal structure of our model to the Weitzman analysis, it is possible to
show that the preference between price and quantity regulation depends upon the
comparison of the variances of the two parameters, θ and α.15 This is consistent
in spirit with the intuitive discussion following Proposition 5 – price regulation is
better at handling technological heterogeneity (variation in θ), quantity regulation
better at handling motivational heterogeneity (variation in α).
Secondly, our model assumes that the external cost is linear in the activity level
(that is, the external damage is cx) while benefits are concave in the activity level.
The standard approach assumes damages are convex – indeed this more general
structure is essential to these models, as preference between price and quantity
regulation rests on a comparison of the second derivative of the benefit and cost
curves.
While we have reworked the model more generally our preferred specification
remains the one presented. Absent altruism (setting all α’s equal to 0) linearity of
the damage function creates an unambiguous preference for price regulation. So we
can be clear that the potential superiority of the quantity instrument identified in
Section 5 is because of the introduction of altruism. Incorporating convex external
costs would complicate the analysis by weakening the efficiency of price regulation.
15Weitzman’s analysis involves quadratic approximations of the cost and benefit functions, which
is more appropriate if the uncertain parameter θ has an additive structure rather than the multi-
plicative structure used here. With that modification we can show that the welfare-superiority of
price regulation over quantity regulation equals
∆ =
1
2b′′
[c2σ2α − σ2θ ],
where σ2α and σ
2
θ are the variances of the parameters α and θ, c is the constant marginal cost
associated with the externality and b′′ the slope of the marginal benefit curve is evaluated at the
mean value of θ. The extreme cases discussed in the proof of Proposition 5 emerge as special
cases: Noting that b′′ < 0, price regulation is superior when σ2α → 0, while quantity regulation is
preferable when σ2θ → 0.
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But it is worth noting why that should be the case. With constant marginal external
costs, the efficiency of price regulation depends only on the variance of the altruism
parameter and not on its mean. The efficient tax (1−α)c corrects for the insufficiency
of altruism, and works equally well regardless of the value that α takes. If external
costs were convex, the efficient corrective tax would itself vary with the extent
of altruism, even if that level were uniform in the population. While this is an
interesting observation it would confound the clarity of our main results – those
with regard to variability in the population.
7 Conclusions
Our analysis builds on the evidence that people take into account the impact that
their actions have upon others around them then. They may feel displeasure (‘cold
prickle’) from imposing unpleasantness upon others even when they may be within
their legal rights to do so and this may cause them to moderate their engagement
in externality-imposing activities. At the same time those activities may be subject
to some regulatory or legal control. The question we have addressed in this paper is
the following: How does introducing impure altruism into the regulated population
change regulatory prescriptions?
We have been able to draw a number of conclusions both about the appropri-
ate calibration of any particular instrument and about the comparative merits of
alternative instrument classes.
In general, if individuals’ externality-generating activities are partially restrained
by altruistic motivations, optimal regulatory standards need to be less stringent than
otherwise. If tax is the policy instrument of choice, the existence of altruistic agents
in the population leads to a lower tax being optimal. If quantitative caps are in use
then the optimal cap is higher.
The choice between regulatory instruments depends on the nature of the hetero-
geneity in the population. Loosely speaking, we can think of the model presented
here as featuring two types of heterogeneity – technological (variation in θ’s) and
motivational (variation in α’s). In our set-up price instruments tend to be good
at handling the former but less so at handling the latter. When there is no mo-
tivational heterogeneity the price instrument is unambiguously preferred, but once
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motivational heterogeneity is introduced the ranking of instruments becomes more
complex.
The complexity is best illustrated through our simple example that considers the
optimal regulatory choice when there are just two types of individuals: selfish and
altruistic. Under optimal quantity-based regulation welfare is everywhere improving
in the altruistic proportion in the population. Under optimal price-based regulation
the relationship is non-monotonic. If so, price-based regulation may be preferable
when the regulated population is either predominantly altruistic or predominantly
selfish, quantity-based regulation for intermediate cases.
Our model assumes that the distribution of altruistic tendencies in the population
is exogenously specified and, crucially, is independent of the choice of regulatory
instrument. A recent line of research relating to – but quite distinct from – ours
suggests that the use of price incentives may itself diminish pro-social behavior,
perhaps by crowding-out intrinsic motivation. The works of Frey and Oberholzer-
Gee (1997), Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a, 2000b) and Brekke et al. (2003)) provide
a representative sample. In terms of our model, this creates the possibility that the
choice of instrument might affect the distribution of α’s in the regulated population.
While we acknowledge the value of these lines of inquiry, we have abstracted from any
such effects in our model, taking the attitudes of individuals towards their behavior
as fixed but the behavior itself subject to influence by policy. This allows us to
conclude that it is not the effects identified in that line of research that generate the
apparent under-performance of the tax instrument in the model presented here.
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